Abstract: Since the work of George Richardson on the problem of investment co-ordination, the literature has focused on explaining equilibrium in investment games and neglected the problem of how investments are co-ordinated. This paper reports the findings of a case study of the brick industry which used grounded theory techniques to develop a new analysis of investment coordination. Our main findings indicate that despite the high cost of excess capacity and the very clear signalling of investment intentions, brick firms are reluctant to stand back and delay their own investments when a rival firm is expanding. The fact that for the most part excess-investment is avoided is explained by reference to firms' heterogeneity and constraints to investment.
Introduction
The profitability of an investment project often depends on the investment behaviour of other firms. This is particularly evident in the British brick industry since it is dominated by a small number of rival firms each vying to expand by investing in new capacity and since capital increments are large relative to the market size a clustering of investments would be damaging to the industry as a whole. The research behind this paper began as a test of conventional theories of investment inter-action. Data on firm and plant capacities was collected in order to carry out tests for inter-dependence along the lines of those conducted by Gilbert and Lieberman (1987) . The results of those regressions (reported in Wood 2003) failed to corroborate existing theories of investment inter-dependence but did find evidence for a number of firm specific effects, with some indication of investment inter-dependence that varied across firms and across time. The lack of support for existing models of investment inter-dependence left unanswered the puzzle of how excess investments in the brick industry are avoided. At this juncture in the research process a new research opportunity arose which departed from conventional approaches. We were able to re-visit the data sources used for the statistical tests and to obtain qualitative data that could shed some light on the issue of how investments by rival brick manufacturers are co-ordinated. Since the motive for under-taking this second stage of the research was to explore the gap that existed in the existing investment literature on the subject of how firms interact through their investments we adopted an exploratory approach to theory building. Instead of confronting the data with a host of priors we adopted an inductive methodology that enabled us to ground a theory on the quantitative and qualitative evidence following principals laid down by Glaser and Strauss (1967) .
Clearly this stage of the current research had not been undertaken upon a tabula rasa. Firstly, while our statistical studies led us to view the existing theories of investment inter-dependence with some scepticism, we were less sceptical of the literature that theorises the determinants of firms' investment. For example, knowledge of the role of adjustment costs, financial constraints, uncertainty and irreversibility clearly formed part of the background knowledge of the researchers. Secondly, the statistical tests carried out during the first stage of the research suggested that firm heterogeneity was an important determinant of investment probabilities, and that the influence of firm inter-dependencies varied across time. However, it is important to emphasise that the bulk of our theorising based on our qualitative and quantitative data had been undertaken before our encounter with the work of George Richardson whose work had been published some four decades earlier. Richardson' s contribution fell outside of the parameters of our initial reviews of previous research and it was only after the publication of a collection of essays in tribute to Richardson (Foss and Loasby 1998 ) that we became aware of the relevance of Richardson's 1960 publication, Information and Investment. 1 This 'discovery' of the parallel between our work and the earlier work of Richardson was an important event in the research process. We highlight and contextualise our research alongside Richardson's contribution because we believe that the various parallels demonstrates two things. On the one hand it demonstrates the value of the iterative research process which is central to the grounded theory approach to the study of economic phenomena and secondly the common findings between our work conducted in the 1990s and the earlier work of Richardson increases the validity of the principles of the theory of investment co-ordination we are advancing for the UK brick industry 1 .
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we provide a brief outline of some of the key features of the theoretical investment literature that are relevant to the findings of this study. Our methodological approach is outlined in section 3. In section 4 we provide an overview of the distinguishing features of the brick industry which set the context for our theory development. In section 5 we discuss the four investment strategies that brick firms adopt and illustrate these strategies with case study data. The importance of firm heterogeneity arising from history, physical constraints and preferences for explaining investment behaviour is also discussed, both in relation to the firm's choice of investment strategy and to the sequencing problem. In section 6 it is shown that investment is highly competitive, with no sign of a willingness to backdown -an essential requirement for both co-operative and pre-emptive explanations of sequencing. Our concluding discussion considers how our findings confirm and differ from Richardson's earlier work and makes recommendations for further research.
A brief overview of relevant investment literature
Within a general critique of the concepts of equilibrium and perfect competition Richardson (1960) noted that the profitability of an investment project depends on the investment behaviour of other firms. For Richardson the crucial question is whether firms have sufficient information in order to assess the profitability of an investment opportunity. Richardson argued that a necessary requirement for stable responses to profit opportunities is for 'imperfections or frictions' and 'market connections' which 'clog the competitive system' to exist. Frictions impose a limit on the extent to which competitors can respond and vary the response times of different firms. According to Richardson the existence of these 'market frictions' and their implications for the ability of individual firms to invest in response to a profit opportunity are common knowledge. Consequently the presence of the frictions provides firms with sufficient information of the total supply response, thereby contributing to the resolution of the co-ordination problem. Similarly links, formal or otherwise, between producers or between producers and consumers provides the potential for ensuring an orderly investment response to a profit potential. His central point is that the features of a competitive market, as opposed to a perfectly competitive market, that are regarded by many as market imperfections are in fact necessary features to ensure order and stability in market relations.
Many of the influences on the investment behaviour of firms that Richardson described as frictions have subsequently been incorporated within the formal investment literature. In part the motive for this was to deal with the disappointing empirical performance of the neo-classical model 2 as 1 Grounded theory rests on an analytical inductivist epistemology. As Downward et al. (2002) have pointed out there is very little guidance on offer to researchers working with this approach as to how to proceed with data collection and analysis or more importantly as to the causal status of explanations. We are in broad agreement with their identification of grounded theory as offering scope to identify essential characteristics of a phenomenon leading to the development of a causal explanation. Furthermore that to increase the reliability of inferences, causal research should be formally complemented by statistical research. The current authors suggest that further research should be undertaken to corroborate the explanations set out in this paper.
evidenced by its notoriously poor ability to estimate investment models with either satisfactory fits or out of sample predictive powers. Moreover, the basic Jorgensonian model does not fit well with the stylised facts of investment behaviour. For example, it predicts investment to be highly volatile with low serial correlation, while in fact aggregate investment behaviour has a relatively low volatility and substantially greater persistence than is predicted (Bertola and Caballero 1994) . Further, the persistence of capacity shortages suggest that investment is slow to respond to profit opportunities (Driver and Meade 2001) and at the level of the individual firm the tendency for investments to occur in lumps does not accord with the basic model (Nilsen and Schiantarelli 1996) .
An early attempt to improve the basic model was the incorporation of costs of adjustment. These have been justified by a host of explanations including: the disruption that frequently accompanies investments in new plant and machinery due to the necessary reorganisation of production and organisational structures; the retraining of staff; the cost of dealing with teething troubles in the new production process; and the impact of increases in investment on the price of capital goods. Despite criticism, the convention has been to assume adjustment costs are smooth and convex (Nickell 1978) . More recently models have been proposed that allow for fixed costs of adjustment that have the desirable consequence of predicting a range of inaction, thereby according with the zeroes and lumps of firm investment behaviour (Abel and Eberly 1994) . However, recent evidence suggests that adjustment cost models, whether modelled as quadratic, fixed or linear, are unable to explain the persistence of capital shortages within industries (Driver and Meade 2001) .
A zone of inaction is also implied by the real options approach to modelling investment behaviour that results from the following three features of the investment decision: i) investment expenditure is irreversible; ii) the decision whether or not to invest can be delayed; and iii) the returns to any given investment project are uncertain. Under these assumptions firms have an incentive to delay their investment and require a higher expected rate of return to compensate for the option value of the opportunity to invest (Dixit and Pindyck 1994) . The assumption that firms can wait is crucial. Once we allow for strategic considerations there is, at the very least, a trade off between waiting and benefiting from being the first mover (Spencer and Brander 1992) .
A large literature has examined the effect of capital market imperfections arising from asymmetric information, agency problems and other financing constraints on the firm's investment decisions. Bankruptcy costs and differential tax rates on capital gains and dividends have resulted in a hierarchy of costs of investment finance that depends on their source, while informational imperfections and agency problems have caused a wedge to be driven between the cost of internal funds and that of external funds, the external finance premium, which increases with the cost of information and decreases with the internal resources available to the firm. Together these considerations give rise to a pecking order (or hierarchy) theory of corporate financing in which, contrary to the Modigliani-Miller (1958) theorem, firms prefer internal finance over external finance and debt finance over equity finance (Myers 1984) . In a recent review of this literature,
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They are the accelerator model, which emphasises the role played by demand; the neo-classical model which brings to the fore relative prices of inputs; and Tobin's q theory and the role of profitability. Until recently these approaches have been seen as distinct alternative models of investment (Kopcke 1985; Berndt 1991) . They are increasingly seen as potential complements, from which hybrid models can be developed (Chirinko 1987; Cuthbertson and Gasparro 1995) . Hubbard (1998) has concluded that empirical studies show that investment is positively correlated with proxies for net worth and that the net worth effect is largest for firms that are likely to face capital market imperfections.
While Richardson (1960) has been cited as an important analysis of how firms actually compete, subsequent research into investment inter-dependence has been restricted to an increasingly formal framework in which the focus is on the conditions for equilibrium and the presence of first-mover advantage. The question of how an industry moves towards an equilibrium level of capacity while avoiding a tendency to over-investment has been side stepped. How the co-ordination problem is resolved depends on how the models are specified and specifically how firms are allowed to vary. For example, in models in which firms are assumed to vary in size only, such as the static model of Gilbert and Harris (1984) and the multi-period model of Sadanand and Sadanand (1996) , size is the determining characteristic (smaller firms are found to invest first in the former, while the latter finds that larger firms have a first mover advantage). In models that assume differential costs Ghemawat (1984) shows that low cost firms have first mover advantage, so long as demand uncertainty is not too great, while in the duopoly newsboy model of Driver and Goffinet (1998) the low cost firm chooses a higher capacity than its rival but has a lower expected utilisation rate. In their multi-period model of pre-emption, Gilbert and Harris (1984) resort to an ad hoc assumption of differential decision lags to determine the order of investment. While these models recognise that firm heterogeneity has important implications for investment inter-dependence, heterogeneity is added as a convenience, often in order to produce a mathematical solution, and is not treated as an essential structural feature of the model.
It is the view of the current authors that the findings of recent research into investment coordination have been constrained by the prior assumptions of the models. The object of this paper is to re-examine the co-ordination process using a combination of quantitative and qualitative data regarding the investment behaviour by British brick manufacturers to advance a grounded theory of investment sequencing. The brick industry was chosen because economic and technological factors (high fixed costs of production and large minimum incremental capacity changes relative to the local market) combine to make excess capacity a real and costly problem. To put this in the context of the existing theoretical literature, the high costs associated with over-investment should provide the conditions that either encourage firms to co-operate in order to avoid excess capacity, or make pre-emption particularly effective. However, the current study will argue that successful sequencing in the brick industry is neither due to co-operation or pre-emption. Instead an explanation for the sequencing that does take place, as well as the sequencing failures, is found in an examination of market connections and 'imperfections' similar to those highlighted by Richardson some forty years ago. Where the paper differs from Richardson is in arguing that the role of the imperfections is one of impeding 'competitive investments' rather than providing information.
The role of Grounded Theory
Our main objective was to gain a holistic understanding of the co-ordination problem/ process which had to date been under-theorised. To move beyond the impasse suggested by the initial econometric tests we looked for a research approach that would allow us to study the actual process of individual firms' experience and behaviour and engage in a process of 'theory discovery'. We also wanted to articulate the structural conditions of the phenomena under examination. So we needed a methodology that permitted rigorous analysis of the data leading to a (partial) explanation of the co-ordination problem. With these requirements foremost we selected the grounded theory approach most often associated with the work of Glaser and Strauss (1967) . Grounded theory is noted for its relevance to situations of 'theory discovery' and under-theorised empirical situations (Downward et al. 2002) . However, the main feature of the grounded theory approach which recommended it to our research requirements was its ability to synthesise qualitative and quantitative data and its 'constant comparative' approach to data analysis described as a 'running theoretical discussion' between the data and established concepts and emergent concepts / theories (Wells 1995 , Barnes 1996 . The detail of this iterative process of data analysis have been discussed at length elsewhere (Glaser and Strauss 1967, Strauss and Crobin 1998) . While it is not necessary to reiterate the detail of the methodological procedure here, it is important to stress that the term 'emergent concept / theory' does not imply that concepts or theory emerge from the data in some 'mystical' fashion. They are in every respect the product of data analysis directed by the researchers who typically draw upon their own beliefs and knowledge of the wider literaturehence the idea of the 'running theoretical discussion' noted above. We also want to stress the relevance of grounded theory for uncovering structural conditions. 3 We share Silverman's (1985) view that qualitative data display economic, cultural and social realities/ structures. This is corroborated in Glaser's recent insistence that the comparative method uncovers structures and conditions that are 'real' and 'really exist' (Glaser 1992) .
Research Design
As is common with studies that apply grounded theory techniques the research method/instruments were developed and modified as the fieldwork progressed and the research question evolved. The research programme can be segmented into four stages, defined according to the nature of the research question being asked. These stages and the research methods/instruments adopted are summarised in table 1.
The stages identified in table 1 are distinguished by the thrust of the central research question and roughly correspond to the chronological development and direction the fieldwork took. However, that is not to say that the research agenda of each stage is mutually exclusive of other stages. For example, the question of whether firms' investments are influenced by the investment of their competitors is underlying the research question of each of the four stages, but only in stage 1 is it addressed in a direct manner, either in interviews or by statistical hypothesis testing. Similarly, information regarding how firms change their capacity and why they choose a particular investment strategy (e.g. focusing the investment on modernisation, expansion of existing plants, the construction of new plants or the acquisition of other brick producers) was inevitably touched upon during the fieldwork carried out in stage 1, but it is in stage 2 that these questions are placed at the heart of the research agenda.
5 During stage 1 the research agenda was strongly influenced by the existing literature for investment co-ordination and co-operation. The existing theories were seen to be lacking in respect of both empirical validity and, more importantly, a theoretical explanation of how firms actually interact in practice. After this initial stage the existing theoretical literature has far less input as to the direction in which the research is directed. Instead the direction of the fieldwork is being suggested by the preliminary findings of the specific case study. Only towards the end of the fieldwork is there a return to the literature when in stage 4 we look at commonalities between the findings of the case study and the existing literature.
Qualitative Data Collection
The British brick industry is dominated by a small number of multi-plant firms. Table 2 categorises the main brick producers by their size. Site visits for face to face interviews took place at head offices and brickworks of Hanson, Ibstock and Chelwood. In addition telephone interviews were conducted with senior managers of Baggeridge, Marshalls, Blockleys and Ockley in addition to a large number of managers of smaller firms that are not included in table 2. A list of interviews is contained in the appendix. A tape recorder was not used due to the sensitivity of the information and anonymity was a pre-requisite that most interviewees insisted upon. Interviews were structured by a list of pre-prepared questions, but these were adapted as new issues arose. All notes from interviews were condensed into typed transcripts that were supplemented by fieldnotes. (1983) as Large: deliveries of around 1,400m; medium: deliveries between 140m and 315m; small: deliveries between 50m and 100m. For 1989 and 1996 the categories are based on the capacity data obtained for this study, and are broadly consistent with the MMC's categories. Large: capacity in excess of 350m; Medium: capacity between 100m and 350m; Small: capacity between 50m and 100m. * Ambion was created in March 1997. It is included in this table because it was a direct result of the MMC requirement for Ibstock to sell five of its brickworks following its 1996 acquisition of Redland Brick.
Qualitative Data Analysis
The qualitative data was systematically analysed using the framework outlined by Glaser and Strauss (1967) . Contact was maintained with several informants throughout the course of the fieldwork; this served the purpose of corroborating interpretations of the data and collecting new information as the need arose. Although the interviews were conducted during the period 1997-1999, informants included senior managers from firms that had either ceased to exist as independent entities or whose ownership had fundamentally changed, including Steetley, Redland and Salvesen.
Quantitative Data Collection and Analysis
In addition to the qualitative data obtained from interviews, plant level capacity data was obtained for the period 1986-1996. This data was collected and analysed during the early stages of the research process and was used to conduct a statistical analysis of investment behaviour using a firm level panel that built on the methodology of Gilbert and Lieberman (1987) . The results from that analysis, reported in Wood (2003) , failed to find support for conventional models of investment coordination. These findings did however point to a great deal of firm heterogeneity, with firm specific variables having a significant impact on the probability of a firm making an investment, while the limited firm interaction effects that were identified were found to be unstable over time. The current discussion uses these quantitative data alongside our qualitative data to explore how the co-ordination problem is resolved.
Distinguishing features of the brick industry
The aim in this section is to situate our fieldwork by outlining some basic and key features of the British brick industry. As table 2 indicates the research period began with a single dominant but declining company, LBC. From the mid-to late 1980s the majority of market demand has been shared by different combinations of two firms; first Hanson Brick and Steetley, then Hanson and Redland, and finally Hanson and Ibstock. The number of medium sized firms has fluctuated between 4 and 6, with the composition of this group changing as they disappear by acquisition (Steetley, Redland, Marley and Tarmac) and are replaced by previously small firms that have grown by internal investment (Baggeridge, Salvesen/Chelwood, Marshalls). The departures from the Small category are due to them being acquired (Westbrick, Scottish, Bowater, Nottingham) or because they have reduced in size by plant rationalisation (Ockley) or because they have expanded and become medium sized (Baggeridge, Salvesen/Chelwood, Marshalls).
To understand the investment co-ordination process it is essential to recognise that capacity increments are large relative to the size of the market and firms have limited ability to vary capacity utilisation. These features combine to make the capacity decisions of brick firms crucial to the profitability of the industry. The principal determinant of the capacity of a brick factory is the size and number of its kilns. Kiln size, and therefore plant size, has grown dramatically. Brick plants built during the 1960s typically operated one or two kilns each with a capacity of approximately 20 million bricks per year. By the 1990s a modern brick plant would have a capacity in excess of 100m bricks per year, either from two kilns of 40-50 million capacity each or a single tunnel kiln of anything up to 120 million capacity. To put this in perspective, as a rule of thumb we can say that an increment of capacity constitutes between 5-10% of the regional market.
A number of considerations deter producers from reacting to large downward swings in demand by varying output. First, the high fixed energy costs make it uneconomic to operate kilns at much below full capacity. Second, firms are reluctant to mothball kilns. Once the kilns are allowed to cool equipment, ranging from kiln cars to computerised control facilities, quickly rust in the damp conditions of an unused plant. In addition, when a kiln is allowed to cool it can deteriorate and even collapse when re-lit. Consequently the plant and machinery of mothballed brickworks often require substantial investment before it can be reused. Third, the firm will be reluctant to lose the small but highly skilled labour force. 4 Finally, during interviews Production Directors repeatedly asserted that their primary objective was to maximise or maintain their market shares. 5 An interviewee from the industry's trade association described the concern of the large firms with their market share as "obsessive", and told of one firm that regularly estimated its market share correct to two decimal places. Interviews indicated this to be of great significance, with labour skills being plant specific due to the uniqueness of each brick factory (T31). See appendix list of interviews. 5 One interviewee acknowledged that the objective of maintaining market share was often in conflict with the interests of shareholders. He described how he received targets for rates of return from the firm's owners but these targets were effectively ignored, replaced by the primary objective of maximising market share. 1 9 6 0 1 9 6 2 1 9 6 4 1 9 6 6 1 9 6 8 1 9 7 0 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 weeks Figure 1 shows a plot of brick stocks divided by the average weekly deliveries for that year. Since brick producers are constrained to operate their productive facilities at approximately full capacity an excessive build up of stocks can be seen as evidence of either firms bringing on stream too much capacity or of a decline in demand. For most of the post-1960 period stocks are fairly stable at between 2-10 weeks of deliveries, with occasional spikes in the series indicating that production is running ahead of demand. This suggests that in general firms avoid holding excess capacity, but there are periods when the industry as a whole has a productive capacity that is out of line with demand. An analysis of forty years of production, deliveries and stock data showed that increases in stocks are generally preceded by declining deliveries, which suggests that the periods of rapid stock building are due to declines in demand and not to excessive production that results from over investment (Wood 2000) . An exception to this finding is the post-1994 upturn in stocks which was in large part caused by a substantial investment in new capacity not justified by prospective demand. We identify this period of excess investment as a useful testing ground for the theory that is elaborated below.
Alternative Investment Strategies
Interviews with Production Directors indicated a consensus concerning the objectives of investment. Four investment objectives were identified: increase market share; modernise and enhance the productivity of existing capacity; expand geographically; and minimise stockholdings. Despite this consensus, firms vary a great deal in the ways in which they focus their investments. Analysis of actual investment behaviour allowed us to identify four investment styles, with firms' investment strategies consisting of adopting one or more of the following four investment styles: acquire already existing plants; build new greenfield plants; expand existing plants; and modernise existing plants. None of the investment styles achieve all the identified objectives (table 3) . In practice firms vary considerably in the extent to which they combine the four investment styles. During the period examined all firms invested in modernising their existing plants but only a small number managed to combine all the investment styles (Salvesen, Steetley and Tarmac). Other firms tended to expand by either focusing their efforts on building new capacity on existing or greenfield sites or by acquiring rival brick manufacturers. For the moment we will simply note that each of the investment styles has different implications for the sequencing problem. Modernising plants has a relatively small net capacity effect, but may result in the investing firm possessing very efficient capacity that puts them in a strong position for surviving a war of attrition. Expansions of existing plants and the construction of new greenfield sites can have very large net capacity effects, and therefore profound implications for the sequencing problem, but they have quite different adjustment costs and gestation lags. The acquisition of capacity has no direct net capacity effect and therefore does not accentuate the sequencing problem.
In the following sub-sections we will outline the key determinants of firms' different investment strategies. In so doing we shall illustrate the dynamic inter-dependence of firm heterogeneity and investment constraints. We shall argue that these two forces are at the heart of the resolution to the co-ordination problem. Our analysis distinguishes between firm specific constraints that operate at two levels: the objective physical constraints of location and plant histories; and the subjective influences of strategic leadership of managers. We also identify general constraints that limit the scale and timing of investments. These will be examined under the sub-headings, financial constraints and adjustment costs.
Firm specific determinants of investment strategy
There is a tendency towards firms producing from regionally dispersed sites, with production taking place at very large, modern plants with the advantage of scale economies over scale flexibility becoming increasingly dominant. The firm's initial capacity endowments -the quantity, size, efficiency and location of plants -influences the choice of investment strategy. The relationships identified between capital endowments and histories with investment strategies are summarised in table 4. The discussion below will elaborate on the basis of these relationships. 
Location
The history of most brick firms begin with their operations concentrated in one region. If they have ambitions to expand and become truly national brick producers then it is necessary for them to either acquire production facilities in other parts of the country or to acquire land with clay rights and planning permission to construct greenfield sites. Historically the most successful method of expanding geographically has been to acquire existing capacity, though during the 1980s both Salvesen and Steetley managed to increase their regional spread by expanding on greenfield sites. During the sample period the most expansionary firms, Ibstock, Steetley, Tarmac, Redland and Salvesen, all achieved a more even regional spread. Only Baggeridge increased their capacity significantly without expanding from their original regional base. They achieved this by constructing very modern plants situated in the centre of the country, allowing them to expand their market share without diversifying geographically.
These observations, along with supporting evidence from interviews, confirm that for most firms having a regionally dispersed production base is a pre-requisite for growth. Firms with regionally concentrated facilities therefore favour either growth by acquisition (e.g. Redland) or by investment in greenfield sites (Salvesen/Chelwood). Finally, it should be stressed that the observed investment strategies of these regionally concentrated firms are not freely chosen. Salvesen/ Chelwood would have invested in more greenfield sites but for the problems of obtaining planning permission and the backing of either their owners or their creditors. 7 In addition, both Baggeridge and Salvesen/Chelwood have been looking to acquire factories for some time, especially to obtain a presence in the south east, but the limited availability of targets 8 and the difficulty of raising finance have posed considerable obstacles.
7 As a subsidiary of Christian Salvesen the company's investment proposals were frequently hampered. Following the management buyout of 1995, the newly named Chelwood Brick's found many of their investment proposals were blocked by their creditors (V7).
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8 According to one informant there are no desirable factories in the southeast that are independently owned. By the end of 1986 the largest factories were owned by Hanson and Ibstock. Chelwood claim to have acquired the one available and desirable company, Ockley (V7). The problems Chelwood had experienced in trying to obtain planning permission were well known in the industry and rivals understood this to be the main motive behind their acquisition of Ockley (T30).
Plant scale & technology
The specific features of a given brickworks depends initially on the clay type, the available technology, the current fashion for brick type and the age of the plant. As demand patterns change and technology improves the brick firm must decide how to adapt to the changing competitive environment. Case studies A and B illustrate this point by detailing the contrasting strategies adopted by two firms striving to increase the scale of their operations.
Case study A
During the 1980s the majority of Redland's brickworks were situated in the south east where housebuilders favour light coloured stock bricks which were frequently produced on a small scale. Consequently by 1990
Redland owned a large number of very small brickworks; the average capacity of Redland's brickworks was just 16m, compared to Steetley's average of 40m and Ibstock's 36m. The stock bricks produced by Redland remained in high demand (taking account of the recession) but technology was evolving rapidly, with new simulated (soft-mud) hand-made machinery being increasingly used by Redland's competitors allowing them to produce bricks that had many of the aesthetic features of Redland's stock bricks but with production taking place in mechanised factories on a much larger scale utilising the latest tunnel kilns, resulting in considerably lower unit costs. Redland's initial response was to slowly close down the smallest brickworks whilst expanding and modernising some of the larger ones. This was a slow process until 1992 when Redland acquired Steetley, providing Redland with a much improved balance between small and large scale plants and allowing a faster rationalisation of the smaller, less efficient plants. By 1996 Redland had an average plant size of 38m with just four brickworks with capacities of less than 15 million remaining in production.
Case study B
Redland's approach can be contrasted to that of Baggeridge who by the mid 1980s had an average capacity of approximately 15m, not dissimilar to that of Redland's. Baggeridge's strategy was quite different to that of Redland's. The three existing plants were substantially modernised and expanded and two further plants (one greenfield) were commissioned, each incorporating large tunnel kilns with capacities of at least 50m. In comparison with Redland, although Baggeridge's strategy did not include the option of acquiring other firms it was a very aggressive strategy, yielding very rapid increases in capacity and allowing the company to produce at a very efficient scale that enabled it to penetrate markets in the south east from its base in the midlands.
Land availability
Land availability can have a big influence on the ability of a firm to invest. Some brick plants are situated in rural areas, sometimes surrounded by land that is owned but not used by the brick firm. Others are located in confined spaces, locked in by greenbelt land, by other industrial buildings, or by residential housing. The investment opportunities at a spacious plant are clearly quite different from that at a space constrained plant. Two examples to illustrating these points are provided in the Comparative Case Study box C below.
Case study C Salvesen's plant at Adswood Road, Manchester is situated in a confined space surrounded by other industrial units and residential housing. It is a very modern plant, having received investment aimed at enhancing productivity and efficiency, and has a modern tunnel kiln. Built in 1981, the kiln has since been extended to the maximum length the space available will permit. 9 Consequently, for Salvesen to expand further they have to either construct greenfield sites, as they did when they constructed a new brickworks in the west midlands in 1987, or acquire other firms. By contrast Ibstock's plant at Ibstock, Leicestershire is situated in a rural area that has plenty of space for expansion. For many years Ibstock operated two factories from this site. During the mid 1990s the decision was made to modernise one of the plants by converting it from extruded to soft-mud production and constructing a new tunnel kiln. The luxury of space enabled Ibstock to build the new facilities alongside the old, allowing production to continue at the old factory up until the time when the new factory was ready to be commissioned. 
Plant vintage
In addition to the drive towards larger capacities there is pressure on all firms to invest regularly to maintain facilities and incorporate new technologies. The longer a plant goes without investment, the greater the need for wholesale improvements if it is to remain competitive. To the extent that a firm is endowed with a large number of small, less efficient plants, that firm must look to rationalise and replace those plants with either modernised plants on the old locations, or by acquisitions. Accordingly an important consideration for Redland in their purchase of Steetley Brick (see case study A) was that Steetley had invested heavily and frequently in their facilities, so the acquisition reduced Redland's reliance on high cost, low tech facilities. In contrast Baggeridge and Salvesen both invested significant sums in their plants throughout the 1980s and therefore did not have to resort to such drastic measures to maintain share during the 1990s (see case studies B and C).
Subjective influences of the choice of investment style
We can make some tentative suggestions regarding other sources of the differences in investment styles. Interviews provided examples in which a determining factor in a firm's policy or strategy is that of a dominant personality taking a nonconformist or idiosyncratic approach. This in part reflects the range of different investment strategies available to brick manufacturers that were identified above, with not one of those strategies being unambiguously superior to the others. It can also be seen to result from contrasting lessons learnt from the personal experiences of key decision-makers. Case study D illustrates this point by highlighting the tension between adopting a modernist approach that prioritises investing in the latest technology against the more conservative approach of investing in tried and tested technologies and facilities. 9 Salvesen's internal expansions had reached "saturation point" by 1990, V7.
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10 Ibstock are familiar with the problem of a lack of space, though this problem is only confined to a proportion of their plants: "we've got places in the south east that are blocked in by greenbelt land" (T38).
Case study D
Baggeridge has pursued a very aggressive investment strategy that has involved substantial modernisations of existing plants and the construction of a new, state of the art, greenfield plant. Two striking features of this strategy are the scale of the expansions, increasing the capacity of Baggeridge by about 500% in 10 years, and that the expansionary strategy continued throughout the 1990s when other firms were rationalising capacity. This very aggressive investment strategy goes hand in hand with the Baggeridge view that firms with older plants should make way for firms with more modern plants and contrasts with views expressed by some rival firms that all firms should share the burden of rationalisation.
11 An employee of Baggeridge explains their expansionary orientation as being due to the dominant role taken by the firm's managing director who was formerly the production manager at Butterley.
12 A director at a competitor firm has also suggested that Baggeridge's active investment programme reflects the personality of their managing director.
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Baggeridge's emphasis on internal expansions can be contrasted with Ibstock's preference for growth by acquisition. The Ibstock philosophy was explained in the following terms:
"We expanded by acquisition because opening up greenfield sites in brick making is hazardousyou never know what you'll get."
15
A full exploration of the impact of agents as key decision makers lies beyond the scope of this paper, however the contrasting perspectives of the MDs of these two highly successful firms operating in the same industry is striking. From the evidence obtained we can tentatively suggest that to some extent the difference in their strategic vision reflected the individual experiences the two have had of the different investment styles.
General constraints to the scale and timing of investments 5.2.1 Financial constraints
There is a growing awareness of the importance of the availability of finance to a firm's investment behaviour (Hubbard, 1998) . The general thrust of this literature was supported by the findings of this study with interviewees frequently referring to either the lack of backing or lack of availability of finance as being a frequent constraint to investment. Perhaps not surprisingly, given the relatively depressed state of the construction industry during the period in which this research was carried out, numerous examples of investment intentions constrained by the lack of finance were cited by interviewees. It is important to note that the degree to which the financial constraint bites individual firms varies considerably across firms and across time. Case studies E and F illustrate these points.
11 T16. This view is not universally accepted in the industry (V3). 12 T21. 13 "a high profile character" (V7). 14 Ironically Baggeridge are generally perceived by industry insiders to be facing an uncertain future due to the unpredictable intentions of its owner. Although a PLC, the majority of Baggeridge shares are owned by the family of the Earl of Dudley, who it is suggested are "not really interested in bricks" (V7). As a result the long-term commitment of Baggeridge to the industry is frequently questioned (V2, V4, V7, T13). 15 Ibstock Chairman, Paul Hyde-Thomson, FT (8/2/85), talking long before the acquisitions of Tarmac Brick and Redland Brick. The sentiment was shared by Ibstock's current Production Director (V2).
Case study E An employee of a rival firm described as "market gossip" the view that Ibstock were struggling to finance the debt that was incurred during their acquisition of Redland and were consequently struggling to carry out the investment programme that was required to maintain and modernise their plants. 16 Ibstock's Production Director has confirmed that the presence of a large debt can impede a firm's investment programme.
"A key issue is the availability of finance. If a firm has a large debt then its investment plans are likely to be withstrained."
17
Then referring to an earlier takeover he had been involved in:
"Redland were over-stretched after the Steetley deal and found themselves in high debt. They had to divide their capital amongst the competing interests of tiles, bricks and aggregates. Ultimately the decision was made to divest of some of the recently acquired brick sites. … Redland could not fulfil their strategic objectives [that motivated the takeover of Steetley]."
18
Case study F Financial constraints are not only associated with takeovers:
"They are more general than that. In the context of a multinational PLC the brick division is competing with other parts of the business for funds. When finances are short it has to be a strong decision."
19
The problem is well illustrated by the experiences of Chelwood/Salvesen. A representative from Chelwood Brick described how their expansionary aspirations had been frustrated first by their previous owners, Christian Salvesen, and then by the financial backers following the management buyout. 20 Prominent amongst the spiked projects was a proposed new greenfield site into which Salvesen Brick had invested a substantial amount of preparatory work. Salvesen Brick had hoped to build the plant during 1994, at a time when most of their rivals were in the process of making their first capacity expansions since the 1989 recession (discussed below). However, the plan was decisively rejected by Christian Salvesen who responded to the proposal with a sentiment that was summarised by the interviewee from Chelwood/Salvesen as "you must be joking".
21
While the findings reported in this section are supportive of the investment literature that incorporates capital market imperfections, we can see that conventional indicators of the extent to which a company is financially constrained such as cash flow, profitability or dividend payments, tell only part of the story. The fact that Salvesen/Chelwood brick are regarded as one of the most efficient brick manufacturers in the UK and yet could not invest in new capacity during the mid 1990s because they could not obtain the support of the owners and financial backers indicates that ownership structures can also play an important role. We cannot draw strong conclusions regarding the importance of ownership from this very small sample of firms since some of the firms that did obtain the financial backing to undertake expansions during 1994/5 were similarly part of diversified corporations for whom brick production was a relatively small concern. We can, however, say that that diverse corporate structures and corporate strategies are another way in which firms' investment strategies may vary, and as such facilitate a solution to the co-ordination problem.
Adjustment costs
Adjustment costs associated with delays in production were found to differ from firm to firm. Salvesen described this as a "site specific problem" that largely depended on space. The more the plant is space constrained, the greater the potential for costly delays in production (see discussion above).
22 A slightly different emphasis was made by an interviewee from Ibstock who noted that a major concern was whether delays would cause a loss of custom to their competitors. This depended on whether the product that was being delayed was a unique product, or whether it was easily replaceable by output from other sites.
23
Adjustment costs associated with delays in production, organisational and managerial costs and retraining of staff, can all be regarded as independent of the scale of investment. 24 By contrast, costs associated with both the availability and price of capital machinery are necessarily dependent on the scale of investment across the whole industry. Shortages of brickmaking equipment were reported during the late 1980s when brick makers were actively investing in new capacity not just in the UK, but also in the US, Australia and the Netherlands; the consequence of this investment boom was delivery periods for machinery of 12-18 months. 25 When asked about this, the then Steetley managing director recalled:
"There is a small number of firms making dedicated machinery and it is a worldwide market for this machinery. … During the late 1980s there was a lot of investment going on in this country and in Europe and Australia, so yes, it did frustrate a lot of investment intentions. It was 1990 by the time a lot of the machinery became available and by then it was too late."
26
Thus it would appear that the limited capacity of the industry supplying specialised machinery to the brick industry was an important prevention of excess investment. Interestingly this constraint to over-investment is not necessarily removed during periods of low growth:
"Talking about now, international demand has declined to such an extent that there is less supply available. It wouldn't take much of a boost in demand to cause a problem." 27
Interim Conclusion
We have seen that while the case study includes only a small number of firms producing a standard product there is great variation in the ways in which they invest to increase their productive capacity. It is argued that this heterogeneity of itself has an important bearing on the sequencing problem not only because different investment styles have different implications for the sequencing problem due to their different scale implications, but also because the different investment styles have different gestation lags. This implies that firms have different response rates to investment opportunities, thus potentially going some way to explaining how brick firms have in general avoided bunching their investments and, in principal at least, enabling firms to co-ordinate their investments. More importantly, we have also seen that while firms observe the same investment 22 T40. 23 T39. 24 T39. 25 Building, 23/10/87. 26 T39.
opportunities they have quite different abilities to respond to these opportunities and, moreover, their respective abilities to respond varies across time. The importance of investment constraints and firm heterogeneity is demonstrated by an analysis of a period when a relatively modest investment opportunity was met by a number of firms each with a number of investment proposals in the pipeline that were not subject to the types of constraints outlined above.
Relaxation of Constraints and Investment Sequencing Failure
The relatively orderly investments that occurred during the 1980s, when expansions in capacity lagged behind demand, can be contrasted with the industry's response to the first signs of an end to the recession in the construction industry that occurred during the mid 1990s. The 1994 upturn was brief and tentative and was accompanied by numerous statements from the major brick producers warning against significant increases in capacity that would jeopardise the restoration of some balance between capacity and demand along with the recovery of profit margins. 28 This did not, however, prevent brick producers from scrambling to increase capacity and, therefore, output.
Remarkably the increase in facing brick output during 1994 of more than 440 million was the biggest annual increase in output since 1964 -larger even than 1988, the peak year of the 1980s boom. 29 However, by the middle of 1995 demand prospects were faltering and talk within the industry again returned to the problem of how to remove the excess capacity.
30
It has been suggested that over-investment of this sort is often a result of insufficient information. For example, Richardson (1960) argued that the information problem was at the heart of what he saw as a "fundamental flaw" of the theory of perfect competition. The evidence from this study indicates that the bunching of investments occurred despite the knowledge amongst rival firms that their combined investments were substantially more than could be justified by the fragile recovery in demand. There is no secrecy regarding the investment decisions of rivals. On the contrary, brick firms publicise their investment plans at a very early stage, ostensibly to inform their major customers of extensions to product ranges, but also to signal their investment intentions to their competitors. 31 Press releases are not the only form in which information concerning firms' plans are disseminated. Interviews revealed that there is an enormous amount of gossip being exchanged between firms and within firms, with popular subject matters being who is planning what expansions or closures and who is going to launch a takeover bid for whom.
We suggest that an explanation of the over-investment that occurred during the mid 1990s can be found by analysing the evolution of constraints and heterogeneity. Indeed, this bunching of expansions within a comparatively short time-span has to be reconciled with the argument presented above, that excess capacity investment is in part avoided due to a variety of obstacles to the frequency and scale of expansions that individual firms can carry out at one time.
28 "It would be most unwise, as far as we are concerned, to significantly increase capacity while current margins, though improving, remain so meagre. … There would have to be much stronger evidence of sustained recovery before brick makers that got their fingers burnt with overcapacity are likely to invest in recommissioning mothballed plants." Andrew Smith, MD of Redland Brick, Building, 1/7/94. Similar sentiments were expressed by Hanson (Financial Times, 28/6/94), Ibstock (Financial Times, 5/10/94), Baggeridge (Baggeridge 1994 Annual Report), and Tarmac (Financial Times, 23/2/95). 29 The magnitude of this investment did not simply undermine the profitability of the new capacity, it also undermined the recovery of brick prices and therefore the profitability of previously existing brick plants. 30 Building 21/7/95, 1/9/95.
The bulk of the increase came from 13 separate investments undertaken by seven firms, summarised in table 5. Six of the expansions are new plants or extensions to existing plants, the remainder consist of re-commissioned mothballed capacity. The decision to increase capacity by re-commissioning mothballed plants or kilns is of a different order to the decision to increase capacity by either constructing a new plant or extending an existing one since it is both cheaper and has shorter gestation lags. 32 It follows that the availability of a stock of mothballed kilns and plants has implications for the ability of firms to respond quickly and in large scale to demand opportunities. The real options approach to investment would suggest that firms will be willing to react quickly given an investment opportunity because of the smaller sunk cost component to expanding capacity by restoring mothballed kilns and plants; just as the mothballed capacities were cheap to re-commission, they may also be regarded as expendable should demand decline. More crucially this additional mode of capacity expansion also removes some of the obstacles to expansion discussed above. In particular, problems related to raising finance or obtaining the approval of backers is less prohibitive, while the problem of capital machinery delivery lags is avoided and there is no need to obtain planning permission for the expansion. Of the remaining six expansions in capacity listed in table 5, two (Warnham and Claughton) were new factories that were built on the sites of old factories that had been closed during the recession, while another (Atlas) involved the re-commence of the construction of a new factory that had been partially completed some four years earlier. Each of these expansions would be expected to involve substantially less impediments to their completions in comparison to the construction of a new greenfield plant. Finally, it is reasonable to assume that many other impediments to investment will have been ironed out since each of these investments had been in preparation for some time with the investing firms waiting for some indication that the recession was over.
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We can conclude that an expansion of this magnitude was enabled because conditions were such that many of the constraints to investment were lifted, and that these conditions were associated with the sharp recession and subsequent long period during which brick firms made preparations for expansions whilst waiting for the opportunity to carry out the required investments. This still leaves unexplained why these firms committed themselves to this number of investments in the knowledge that reasonable expectations of future demand could not possibly justify them all. Particularly so given that the need to produce at near full capacity makes excess capacity so costly for brick manufacturers. It would seem that the option of standing back to let rivals claim what increase in demand did occur was tantamount to the surrender of market share. Each firm that invested during the 1994 upturn was responding to the overwhelming need to be a part of the investment race. The decision by any firm not to invest during this period effectively amounts to the conceding of market share. In an industry in which takeovers are a frequent occurrence and size is important, to stand back at such a time is comparable to a raising of the white flag.
Concluding comments
This paper has reported the results of an empirical investigation that addressed the question 'how is excessive bunching of rival firms' investments avoided?' Our findings show that the key to successful sequencing is not due to the adoption of pre-emption or co-ordination strategies but is the outcome of a range of what Richardson has labelled 'market frictions'. Financial, organisational and physical 'frictions' effectively constrain firms' investment intentions, enabling an orderly response to investment opportunities. Successful sequencing is also facilitated by the fact that firms are heterogeneous in terms of resource endowments, ownership structures and abilities to respond to investment opportunities. This diversity leads them to adopt different investment styles with different implications for the sequencing problem. The large amount of mothballed capacity available to firms during the mid-1990s and the build up of shelved investment plans during the recession years effectively removed many of the obstacles to investment that had enabled the successful sequencing of the 1980s.
The most important obstacles to the timing and scale of investments (financial constraints; fixed adjustment costs; and lags in the delivery of capital equipment) were all identified by Richardson as non-neoclassical features of a competitive system that, he argued, were essential for the smooth running of a competitive market. While these frictions have subsequently been incorporated into the mainstream investment literature, the central role that imperfections play in the adjustment process is not highlighted. Moreover, the inclusion of such constraints to investment within formal models of investment behaviour has been done in a piecemeal way and has often been motivated by a concern to reconcile the predictions of the model with actual investment behaviour. For example, models that incorporate either adjustment costs or capital market inefficiencies have the desirable properties that they are consistent with empirical facts that firms have periods of investment inactivity and deviation of actual capital formation from 'desired' capital formation persists over time. The implication being that should such frictions be removed (if that were possible) firms' actual capital formation would converge towards their 'desired' capital formation as defined by the Jorgenson model. This study demonstrates that the opposite is likely to be the case -the relaxation of obstacles to investment can result in a co-ordination problem with the clustering of firms' investments resulting in a tendency for firms to over-invest.
We acknowledge the partial nature of our theory of investment sequencing but contend that it does offer a framework for understanding the evolving nature of the problem. While this study did not set out to test the theories of Richardson (1960) the thrust of the arguments presented here can be found in his analysis of the co-ordination problem. This suggests that future research into investment co-ordination should use the findings of this study and the arguments of Richardson as a point of departure. There is much to be gained from undertaking future research into the coordination problem at the extreme micro level since as Richardson stresses "no single market structure can be regarded as the universal ideal; the requirements for efficient allocation of resources are several, and on occasions, conflicting; and the institutional arrangements most likely to meet them will vary with the nature of the productive techniques and of the demand conditions associated with each particular commodity." (ibid. p.139). While our theory of investment co-ordination that is based on our analysis of the British brick industry casts into the foreground the dynamic interplay between the constraints and firm heterogeneity, it may well be the case that other factors identified by Richardson, including various forms of 'market connections', may play a more important role in other industries. Indeed it is likely that an alternative co-ordinating mechanism will soon be required in the British brick industry since by the end of the 1990s it is evident that the industry is becoming dominated by two very large and evenly matched firms, where firm heterogeneity has been reduced and many of the constraints to investment that were associated with smaller firms have lifted. 
